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Abstract
The fiscal policy environment central banks operate in can be radically different with
respect to debt levels, maturity structures and whether or not fiscal adjustments are spending-
or tax-based. Despite this, most analyses of monetary policy delegation schemes typically
ignore the behavior of the fiscal policy maker. This paper investigates whether delegating
either nominal income or price level targets to a monetary authority yields social gains in
an economy with government debt, where the fiscal policymaker, acting strategically, may
support or undermine the policies of the central bank. We argue that the fiscal environment
plays an important role in determining the performance of monetary policy. The gains to
price level targeting typically found in the literature can be overturned at empirically relevant
debt-to-GDP ratios, when debt stabilization is achieved through spending cuts. In contrast
these gains are retained if the fiscal authorities utilize taxes to respond to shocks and stabilize
debt.
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1 Introduction
Advanced economies differ considerably with regard to their sovereign debt levels and the maturity
of that debt. In 2015, for example, government net debt was about 25 percent of GDP in
Switzerland but 113.5 percent in Italy. The average term to maturity of Sweden’s public debt
was five years, whereas that of the UK was 14.5 years (Source: IMF, 2016). Sims (2013) has
stressed that the effectiveness of monetary policy is influenced by fiscal policy, and that both the
level and maturity of debt play a key role in determining inflation. Nevertheless, the literature
concerned with optimal delegation of monetary policy largely abstracts from such differences
in the fiscal position. The current paper argues that the fiscal position should be considered
a central determinant of an optimal monetary delegation scheme. Countries operating within
different fiscal environments may require different forms of monetary delegation.
This paper builds a New Keynesian business cycle model augmented with fiscal policy, that
is subject to both inflationary cost-push shocks and technology shocks. In the standard New
Keynesian model without a meaningful fiscal policy, optimal monetary policy under commitment
— i.e. time-inconsistent policy where the policy maker is known to keep policy promises — possesses
two important properties. First, it produces the lowest possible welfare loss, thanks to the
policy maker’s ability to manipulate the expectations of the private sector through the policy
commitments it makes. Second, following a shock, it manipulates expectations in this beneficial
way by committing to stabilize not only inflation, but also the price level itself. Instead, a
benevolent central bank which is unable to precommit to such a plan and which has to act in
a sequential and time consistent manner, known as discretionary policy, creates an additional
loss: a welfare-reducing ‘stabilization bias’, see Currie and Levine (1993) and Svensson (1997).
Two prominent proposals to improve welfare outcomes under discretion are to give the central
bank a mandate for price level targeting (Vestin, 2006) or nominal GDP targeting (Jensen and
McCallum, 2002). The rationale is that such mandates would lead the discretionary central bank
to act in a way that induces a history dependence to policy making, through the adoption of
price level control, which is similar to the one arising under commitment. The current paper
examines the effectiveness of these two targeting regimes, albeit in the context of a richer fiscal
environment.
Specifically, we assume that fiscal policy has to finance welfare-relevant government consump-
tion and government debt through distortionary income taxes. Assuming that fiscal policy, as
well as monetary policy, acts under discretion and is bound by existing debt levels and a given
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debt maturity structure, we ask what the welfare gains would be from providing the monetary
authority with either a price level or nominal GDP target. We find that the answer to this
question depends crucially on whether the fiscal policy maker can adjust taxes, or has to adjust
spending to pay the debt. When the fiscal authority has access to taxation, both delegation
schemes perform well, while when the only available fiscal instrument is government spending the
effectiveness of each delegation scheme depends, differently in each case, on the level and maturity
of government debt. It is, in fact, possible, when fiscal adjustment is conducted solely through
government spending, for the delegation scheme to worsen outcomes relative to discretion, even
though such nominal targets have been shown to dramatically improve welfare outcomes in the
context of monetary economies.
The reason for this is as follows. In an economy with meaningful fiscal policy and with access
to taxation as an instrument (in combination with the monetary instrument), the joint monetary
and fiscal policy under commitment can deal effectively with both technology and cost-push shocks
without generating significant unwanted inflation. As a result, although the optimal commitment
policy does not perfectly control the price level, the extent of price level drift is small. Under
discretion, the presence of nominal government debt gives rise to a substantial ‘debt stabilization
bias’, which depends upon both the level and maturity of government debt (Leeper and Leith,
2016) as policy makers face the temptation to inflate away any shock-induced fluctuations in
debt. Economic agents anticipate this and inflation expectations (and inflation itself) rise until
the temptation is removed. This implies a far larger amount of price level drift under discretion.
Delegating a nominal income or, more effectively, price-level target to the monetary authority,
can improve on this significantly, with welfare gains amounting, under our calibration, to around
0.53% of steady-state consumption that the consumer would be willing to give up to move from
the actual regime to the steady-state allocation in the case of a relatively high debt economy like
Italy.
In contrast, without access to taxation as a fiscal instrument the policy makers’ ability to
stabilize the economy in the face of cost-push shocks under commitment is more limited. There-
fore, under the optimal commitment policy there is far less price level control, particularly in
the short run, as surprise inflation becomes a useful tool in stabilizing debt. The corresponding
incremental welfare loss under discretion is smaller, but the two forms of nominal target can
actually make outcomes worse. Essentially, the discipline imposed by price level control can be
counter-productive since the first-best policy under commitment features a non-trivial degree of
price level drift. For example, with high debt levels a price level target can undermine the use
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of a short burst of surprise inflation which would otherwise facilitate the stabilization of debt
following a shock. Therefore, the welfare loss in Italy, for example, would increase by 0.16% of
steady-state consumption, although it would be improved by 0.16% in a low debt economy like
Sweden if these countries were to adopt a price-level target. At the same time, a nominal income
target moderates the initial movements in bond prices when debt is of longer maturity, thereby
reducing the policy makers’ ability to reduce the initial impact of the shock on debt and forc-
ing them to rely on costly changes in government spending to stabilize debt in the longer-term.
This gives rise to a welfare gain of between 0.03%-0.06% of steady-state consumption across all
economies in our sample of 11 representative advanced economies.
The fact that our results depend on the choice of fiscal instrument is of practical relevance,
since Alesina and Ardagna (2010) find that the composition of fiscal consolidation packages varies
over time and across economies with major consolidations in OECD economies between 1970 and
2007 being three times as likely to be tax, rather than spending, based. However, the IMF (2012)
suggest, more recently, that the nine major fiscal consolidations being implemented at the time
were all predominately spending based, as policy makers no longer appear able to implement
significant tax increases. The results in the current paper suggest this may have negative welfare
consequences.
While rich in some dimensions, our analysis deliberately abstracts from analyzing the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary and fiscal policy in the presence of the zero lower bound (ZLB),
debt management policies, and the transition from one steady-state debt level to another. In-
stead, we take a range of combinations of debt level and maturity as given, and ask how the
impact such changes in the fiscal environment have on the policy transmission mechanism affects
the desirability of alternative monetary policy delegation schemes.
The paper is organized as follows. Next, we review the related literature, which further
pinpoints the contribution of this paper. In the following section we outline the model. Section 3
defines all policy scenarios of interest and Section 4 describes the calibration. Section 5 presents
the analysis of all cases we consider, for each of the fiscal instruments. In Section 6 we apply our
results to a representative sample of 11 advanced economies. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature. Despite the potential welfare gains from commitment, there is little ev-
idence either from formal econometric estimation of policy making behavior (Chen, Kirsanova,
and Leith (2013b) and Chen, Kirsanova, and Leith (2013a)), or from policy discussions emanat-
ing from central banks, that policy making is conducted under commitment, particularly when
such policies imply a deliberate offsetting deviation from an inflation target following shocks. In
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light of this, there have been calls to adopt alternative monetary policy delegation schemes as
an alternative means of reducing the welfare loss under discretion with particular emphasis on
price-level targeting (Vestin, 2006) and nominal income growth targeting (Jensen and McCallum,
2002). These calls have been given renewed vigor in the light of the recent financial crisis and
the attendant difficulties of implementing monetary policy when interest rates are constrained by
the zero lower bound (ZLB). For example Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Woodford (2012)
advocate a policy of nominal income targeting as a way of influencing inflation expectations such
that the economy would be lifted off of the ZLB. However, such analyses take place in models
where there is an absence of meaningful monetary and fiscal policy interactions.
In New Keynesian models which do consider monetary and fiscal policy interactions the results
are striking. The optimal Ramsey policy implies a random walk in steady-state debt following
shocks (see, for example, Benigno and Woodford (2003), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007)).
In an application of Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing result, a shock with negative fiscal consequences
results in an adjustment of fiscal variables to sustain the higher level of debt that emerges, but
there is no attempt to return debt to its pre-shock level. This is due to the fact that the optimal
policy precisely balances the short-run costs of fiscal adjustment in a sticky-price model against
the long-run gains of a lower steady state level of debt. Unlike the standard New Keynesian model
without fiscal policy, this policy will not imply perfect control of the price level following shocks,
as there is some use of surprise inflation to stabilize debt (see Sims (2013), and Leeper and Leith
(2016)).1 Since the delegation schemes we explore in this paper re-instate price level control, the
desirability of adopting such schemes will, in turn, hinge on the extent to which optimal policy
would deviate from price level control which will depend on the size and maturity structure of
the debt stock and on the nature of the shocks and available fiscal instruments.
When the policy maker cannot commit to behave in this way, the resultant time-consistent
policy is radically different. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013) show that the debt stock will be
returned to its steady state value following shocks. The commitment policy is inherently time-
inconsistent as the policy maker commits to raise taxes and/or reduce spending to service a
permanently higher debt stock. In doing so the policy maker faces a temptation to induce inflation
surprises to reduce debt and its associated fiscal costs. In the absence of an ability to commit,
economic agents anticipate this temptation, raising expectations of (and actual) inflation. The
policy maker can only avoid this endogenous inflationary bias problem by returning debt to steady-
1The surprise inflation has a twofold benefit for fiscal stabilization through a direct impact on the real value of
debt, as well as expanding the tax base.
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state. The discretionary policy mix employed to achieve this depends crucially on the level of debt.
At low debt levels, fiscal instruments are typically employed to stabilize debt and monetary policy
behaves as usual in controlling aggregate demand to stabilize inflation, while at higher levels of
debt, the implicit policy assignment is reversed andmonetary policy acts to stabilize debt (through
monetary policy’s impact on debt service costs and the tax base), while distortionary taxes are
adjusted to moderate the higher inflation such monetary accommodation would otherwise imply.
However much of this analysis assumes government debt is of one quarter’s maturity. Leeper
and Leith (2016) and Leeper, Leith, and Liu (2016) show that the interactions between monetary
and fiscal policy also depend crucially on the maturity structure of the outstanding stock of
government debt. Given that the presence of government debt and its maturity can have such
a significant impact on the conduct of monetary policy when the two policy makers are acting
cooperatively, but are unable to commit it is important to ask, as we do in this paper, (i) how
fiscal policy influences the conduct of an independent central bank when the two policy makers
interact strategically rather than cooperatively, and (ii) how such interactions affect the design
of monetary policy delegation schemes which hope to achieve outcomes closer to those obtained
under commitment.
2 The Model
We consider the now-mainstream New Keynesian policy model modified to take account of the
effects of fiscal policy, see, for example, Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2003). It
is a closed economy model with two policy makers, the fiscal and monetary authorities. Fiscal
policy is assumed to support monetary policy in the stabilization of the economy around the
non-stochastic steady state. The policy makers may act cooperatively or non-cooperatively.
2.1 Consumers
The economy is populated by a unit-continuum of infinitely-lived households. The representative
consumer maximizes the following objective function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1− 1σt
1− 1σ
+̟
G
1− 1
σ
t
1− 1σ
− δ
N
1+ 1
ψ
t
1 + 1ψ
 , (1)
where Ct, Gt and Nt are a consumption aggregate, a public goods aggregate and labor sup-
ply, respectively.2 Goods are combined via a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) technology to produce
2We focus on cashless limit following Woodford (1998).
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aggregate level variables. Private and public consumption goods aggregates are defined as
Ct =
(∫ 1
0 C
ǫt−1
ǫt
t (z)dz
) ǫt
ǫt−1
and Gt =
(∫ 1
0 G
ǫt−1
ǫt
t (z)dz
) ǫt
ǫt−1
with an elasticity of substitution
between goods of different varieties, Ct (j) and Gt (j) given by stationary stochastic process ǫt
with support (0,∞) and mean ǫ > 1. The time variation in the elasticity of substitution will
translate into time variation in the mark-up, a cost-push shock. Parameter ψ  0 measures the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, β ∈ (0, 1) is the
households’ discount factor, δ > 0 and ̟ > 0 are preference parameters.
Optimization of expenditure across individual goods implies the households’ demand function
for a differentiated good z, Ct(z) =
(
pt(z)
Pt
)−ǫt
Ct with an associated aggregate price level of
Pt =
(∫ 1
0 p
1−ǫt
t (z)dz
) 1
1−ǫt .
The budget constraint at time t is given by:
PtCt + P
S
t B
S
t + P
M
t B
M
t ≤ B
S
t−1 +
(
1 + ρPMt
)
BMt−1 + (1−Υt) (WtNt +Ψt)− Tt,
where PtCt =
∫ 1
0 pt(z)Ct(z)dz is nominal consumption, Wt the nominal wage rate, Tt are lump-
sum taxes, Υt is a tax on nominal income. The household’s period-t income includes: wage
income from providing labor services to goods producing firms, WtNt, profits from monopolisti-
cally competitive firms Ψt =
∫ 1
0 Ψt (z)dz, both of which are taxed at rate Υt, and payments on
the portfolio of assets BSt and B
M
t . The household also pays a lump sum tax, Tt, which is used
to finance a steady-state production subsidy.3
Households hold two forms of government bond. The first is one-period debt, BSt , which has a
price equal to the inverse of the gross nominal interest rate, PSt =
1
1+it
. The second type of bond
is actually a portfolio of many bonds which, following Woodford (2001) pay a declining coupon
of ρj, j + 1 periods after being issued, where 0 < ρ < β−1. The duration of the bond is 11−βρ ,
which means that ρ can be varied to capture changes in the maturity structure of debt. We only
need to price a single one of these longer-term maturity bonds, since any existing bond issued j
periods ago is worth ρj of new bonds.4
Household wealth in period t can be written as
Dt =
(
1 + ρPMt
)
BMt−1 +B
S
t−1
3These lump sum taxes are not available for stabilization purposes as re-introducing Ricardian Equivalence
would render the policy problem trivial - see Section 5.1 for a discussion.
4See also Leeper and Leith (2016).
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and we require the following transversality condition to hold
lim
T→∞
Et
1
Rt,T
DT
PT
= 0
where Rt,T =
T−1∏
s=t
(
(1+ρPMs+1)
PMs
Ps
Ps+1
)
for T > 1 and Rt,t = 1.
The resultant optimization yields a labor supply condition
Wt
Pt
=
δN
1
ψ
t
(1− τ t)C
− 1
σ
t
, (2)
the consumption Euler equation
1
1 + it
= βEt
C
− 1
σ
t+1
Πt+1C
− 1
σ
t
, (3)
and bond pricing equation
PMt = βEt
C
− 1
σ
t+1
Πt+1C
− 1
σ
t
(
1 + ρPMt+1
)
, (4)
where we define gross inflation as Πt ≡
Pt
Pt−1
.
2.2 Firms
Firms set their prices subject to a Calvo (1983) price rigidity. The firm’s optimization problem
is standard5: a firm i chooses prices to maximize profits
Et
∞∑
s=t
Qt,s
(
Ys (i) ps (i)−
1
µw
WsNs (i)
)
,
where Qt,s = β
s−t
(
Cs
Ct
)−1/σ
Pt
Ps
is the household’s stochastic discount factor and µw a time-
invariant employment subsidy which can be used to eliminate the steady-state distortion as-
sociated with monopolistic competition and distortionary income taxes. The firm faces three
constraints when choosing prices: (i) the available production technology
Yt (i) = ZtNt (i) ,
5See Appendix A for more details. Here and elsewhere we refer to the Online Appendix.
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where Zt is an exogenous stochastic technology process, (ii) a downward sloping demand curve
implied by individual goods being imperfect substitutes in consumption,
Yt (i) = Yt
(
pt (i)
Pt
)−ǫt
,
where Yt =
(∫ 1
0 Y
ǫt−1
ǫt
t (i)di
) ǫt
ǫt−1
, and (iii) the fact that in any period the firm is only able to
change prices with probability 1− α.
Profit maximization implies the following first order conditions to determine pt (i):
0 = Et
∞∑
s=t
(αβ)s−t Ys
(
(ǫs − 1)C
− 1
σ
s
(
pt (i)
Ps
)1−ǫs
(5)
−
δǫs
µwZs (1−Υs)
(
Ys
Zs
) 1
ψ
(
pt (i)
Ps
)−(1+ 1
ψ
)
ǫs

and the aggregation over individual prices yields(
pt
Pt
)1−ǫt
=
1− αΠǫt−1t
1− α
. (6)
Price dispersion ∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫt
di evolves according to
∆t = (1− α)
(
1− αΠǫt−1t
1− α
) ǫt
ǫt−1
+ αΠǫtt ∆t−1. (7)
2.3 Fiscal Constraint
The government buys goods (Gt), taxes income (at tax rate Υt), raises lump-sum taxes, Tt,
pays an employment subsidy St, and issues long and short-term nominal debt B
M
t and B
S
t . The
government budget constraint can be written as:
PMt B
M
t =
(
1 + ρPMt
)
BMt−1 + PtGt −ΥtPtYt − Tt + St, (8)
where we assumed that the aggregate stock of one-period bonds is in zero net supply, BSt = 0.
The employment subsidy is St =
(
1− 1µw
)
WtNt.
We assume that lump-sum taxes Tt are used solely to finance the employment subsidy St so
their net effect is zero, Tt = St.6 For analytical convenience we introduce Bt = BMt /Pt, so that
6 In Section 5.1 we do allow the policy maker to utilize lump-sum taxes to satisfy its budget constraint, but
solely as a means of identifying how government spending and distortionary tax rates would be employed to offset
shocks without the need to simultaneously achieve fiscal solvency. This helps explain the relative efficacy of the
two types of fiscal instrument in subsequent policy exercises where the need to stabilize debt is re-introduced.
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equation (8) becomes
PMt Bt =
(
1 + ρPMt
) Bt−1
Πt
+Gt −ΥtYt. (9)
2.4 Market Clearing and Evolution of the Economy
Aggregation of the private and public sector budget constraints results in the aggregate resource
constraint
Yt = Ct +Gt, (10)
which can replace one of either of the individual budget constraints. While the aggregate pro-
duction technology is given by
Yt = Nt
Zt
∆t
. (11)
The allocation {Ct, PMt ,Πt,∆t, Bt, Yt,Nt}
∞
t=0 given policy {it, Gt,Υt} and shock processes
{Zt, ǫt} is the private sector equilibrium if it satisfies the system of first order conditions (3)- (7)
and (9)-(11).
2.5 The Model in Gap Form
In order to tractably solve the model in the presence of potential strategic interactions between
the monetary and fiscal policy makers we recast the policy problem in a linear quadratic (LQ)
form. In doing so we employ the device of a steady-state employment subsidy which ensures that
the deterministic steady state is efficient. This allows us to generate a valid LQ approximation
to the underlying policy problem across all the types of policy we consider.7
In maximizing social welfare (1) subject to the technology and resource constraint, the social
planner would ensure the following allocation was applied
̟G
∗− 1
σ
t = C
∗− 1
σ
t ,
C
∗− 1
σ
t Z
1
ψ
+1
t = δY
∗ 1
ψ
t ,
where the superscript ∗ is used to denote the efficient equilibrium.
7 If we did not adopt an efficient steady-state then the second order approximation to social welfare would
include linear terms which would both prevent us calculating a valid second-order approximation to welfare using
a linearized model and would also introduce an inflation bias to our policy problem. Eliminating the level bias
allows us to focus on the stabilization bias.
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We can contrast this allocation to the decentralized equilibrium that would be achieved under
flexible prices
1
µ
=
1
Z
1
ψ
+1
t µ
w (1−Υt)
δY
1
ψ
t
C
− 1
σ
t
,
where µ = ǫǫ−1 . We choose the steady state subsidy such that µ
w = µ1−Υ and adopt the steady
state government spending rule GY = (̟
−σ + 1)
−1
, so that the steady state level of output is
identical to the optimal level of output in the efficient steady state that would be chosen by the
social planner, Y = Y ∗ = δ−
σψ
σ+ψ (1 +̟σ)
ψ
σ+ψ .
In the various experiments we conduct below we focus on the implications of varying both
the debt to output ratio and the maturity of that debt stock. Variations in these variables will
not alter the underlying steady state values for consumption, output and labor supply, as the
steady state subsidy will adjust to changes in the tax rate needed to support an alternative
debt to output ratio, cet. par. to ensure that these variables remain at their efficient levels in
steady state. Therefore, our focus is not on transitioning from one distortionary debt level to
another. Instead, different assumptions about the steady state level of debt and its maturity
will significantly impact on the policy transmission mechanism implying quite different gains to
alternative delegation schemes in the face of shocks.
We rewrite the linearized model as8
ct = Etct+1 − σ (it − Etπt+1) , (12)
pMt = −it + βρEtp
M
t+1, (13)
πt = υˆt +
κψ
ǫ+ ψ
(
Υ
1−Υ
τ t +
1
ψ
yt +
1
σ
ct
)
+ βEtπt+1, (14)
B˜t = − (1− ρ)
B
Y
pMt +
1
β
B˜t−1 −
1
β
B
Y
πt +
(1− βρ)
β
((1− θ) gt −Υyt −Υτ t) + ζˆt, (15)
yt = θct + (1− θ) gt, (16)
where we use lower case variables to denote ‘gap’ variables, where the gap is the difference between
linearized actual level and the efficient level of the variable i.e. xt = Xˆt − Xˆ
∗
t .
9 Parameter
κ = (1− α) (1− αβ) /α and θ = C/Y is the steady state consumption to output share.
The model is subject to two shocks: the cost-push shock υˆt = −
κψ
ǫ+ψ
1
ǫ−1 ǫˆt, and a shock ζˆt
which measures the fiscal consequences of technology shocks
ζˆt = −
B
Y
(
1− β
β
σ +
(1− ρ) (1− ρz)
1− βρρz
)
ψ + 1
σ + ψ
Zˆt, (17)
8Full details of the linearization of the model are given in Appendix B.
9The only exception for this notation rule is taxes. Here τ t = Υˆt.
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where technology and cost push shocks follow AR(1) processes
Zˆt = ρzZˆt−1 + σzηz,t, |ρz| < 1, ηz,t ∼ N (0, 1)
υˆt = ρυυˆt−1 + συηυ,t, |ρυ| < 1, ηυ,t ∼ N (0, 1)
with parameters ρz, σz and ρυ, συ, respectively.
The ‘efficient’ values of bond prices are those that are consistent with the efficient allocation
that would be implemented by a benevolent social planner, see Appendix C:
ıˆ∗t =
1
σ
Cˆ∗t+1 −
1
σ
Cˆ∗t = −
ψ + 1
σ + ψ
(1− ρz) Zˆt,
PˆM∗t =
ψ + 1
σ + ψ
(1− ρz)
(1− βρρz)
Zˆt,
Yˆ ∗t =
ψ + 1
σ + ψ
σZˆt,
Gˆ∗t =
ψ + 1
σ + ψ
σZˆt,
Cˆ∗t =
ψ + 1
σ + ψ
σZˆt,
Υˆ∗t = 0.
It is straightforward to demonstrate that a quadratic approximation to households’ utility can
be written as10
Wt = −
1
2
δY
1
ψ
+1
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
θ
σ
c2s +
1− θ
σ
g2s +
1
ψ
y2s +
ǫ
κ
π2s
)
+ tip+O(2), (18)
where tip denotes ‘terms independent of policy’ and O(2) captures terms of order higher than
two in the approximation of social welfare. Since government spending is defined in gap terms,
we are implicitly measuring the movements of the instrument away from its efficient level in a
sticky-price economy. The terms in real variables contained in the objective function reflect the
costs of deviating from the optimal trade-off between consumption and labor supply in household
utility, while inflation is costly as it induces a distribution of prices across firms which leads to
inefficiencies in the pattern of household consumption of different goods and in the distribution
of labor supply across firms.
3 Policy
There are two independent policy makers: the monetary and the fiscal authority. The monetary
authority controls the short-term interest rate it while the fiscal authority controls spending gt,
10See Appendix C.
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which is defined in gap form and/or the income tax rate τ t.
3.1 Policy Problems
The social loss is approximated by the following quadratic criterion
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tUSs , (19)
where
USs = π
2
s +
θκ
σǫ
c2s +
κ
ψǫ
y2s +
(1− θ)κ
σǫ
g2s .
The fiscal authority adopts this objective function, while the monetary authority either does the
same or seeks to minimize a delegated loss function containing a price level or nominal income
target.
Prior to considering strategic interactions between policy makers, as a benchmark, we compute
the stabilization bias (Svensson, 1997) arising in our economy when the two policy makers are
benevolent and share the same policy objective (19), but cannot commit. We then seek to explore
the benefits of assigning the monetary authority a different set of policy objectives in an attempt
to improve social welfare. This section explains this starting point for our investigation and then
details the two delegation regimes.
3.1.1 The Starting Point: Benevolent Regimes and the Stabilization Bias
The effectiveness of a delegation scheme is usually measured by how well it reduces the welfare
costs of shocks relative to the case of time-consistent discretion. It is hoped that delegation will
achieve gains relative to the case where policy is time-consistent, since this is subject to a stabiliza-
tion bias (Svensson, 1997), where the latter is an intrinsic feature of dynamic discretionary policy
in many rational expectations models. The best stabilization outcome is achieved when both
policy makers jointly minimize the social loss (19) under commitment (C), where the dynamic
path of policy instruments {is, gs and/or τˆs}∞s=t is chosen in the initial moment t. Specifically,
the optimization problem under commitment is
LCt = min
{is,Fs}∞s=t
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tUSs ,
subject to the system of constraints (12)-(16). Here and below it is period-t instrument of the
monetary policy maker, while Ft is the set of fiscal policy instruments and takes the values of
12
{gt} , or {τ t} , or {gt, τ t} depending on policy scenario of interest. This regime yields the minimum
conditional loss, which we denote LCt and use as a benchmark.
In contrast, the discretionary optimization problem is sequential. Under discretion (D), in
every period the policy makers only choose the current level of instruments. The private sector
knows that the policy makers will re-optimize and sets expectations accordingly.11 The policy
maker, therefore, solves the following Bellman equation
Vt = min
it,Ft
(
USt + βEtVt+1
)
subject to the system of constraints (12)-(16). Here Vt is the value function. The joint optimiza-
tion of social welfare under discretion generates a higher welfare loss relative to commitment — the
stabilization bias — because the ‘average’ volatility of welfare-relevant variables under discretion
exceeds the volatility under commitment. This is due to the fact that under discretion the policy
maker cannot make credible promises about how they will behave in the future. The inability to
do so means they cannot exploit the expectational benefits such promises can achieve. We denote
LDt > L
C
t the loss under discretion conditional on initial conditions.
12
The two delegation schemes which we describe next are designed to improve the welfare loss
under discretion, but have typically only been considered in contexts where there is no meaningful
interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. We focus on two regimes which invoke a form
of price level control for the monetary policy maker, specifically price level and nominal income
targeting.
3.1.2 Delegation: Monetary Price Level Targeting
The first regime we consider is monetary price-level targeting (MPLT). This regime has been
thoroughly investigated in models without fiscal policy, where it generally yields a substantial
reduction in the welfare costs of shocks relative to discretion, effectively removing much of the
original stabilization bias, and would perfectly mimic the commitment solution were our model
to exclude fiscal policy and assume all shocks are i.i.d. (see Vestin, 2006). In a model with
fiscal policy, however, this regime allows us to evaluate the welfare implications of price stability
in an environment with debt accumulation, where non-cooperative fiscal policy can potentially
11A detailed treatment of commitment and discretion can be found in, for example, Currie and Levine (1993).
12We focus on conditional rather than unconditional welfare, as we rely on the theoretical result that commitment
always dominates discretion in terms of conditional welfare so the problem of designing a delegation scheme to
attempt to reduce the stabilization bias is well defined. In welfare evaluations we assume that economy starts in
the deterministic steady state.
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augment or offset the actions of the monetary policy maker. Following standard applications of
a price-level target (Svensson, 1997; Vestin, 2006), we solve the following problem
Φp = arg min
Φp≥0
LMPLT (Φp)
where LMPLT (Φp) is the conditional loss generated by the non-cooperative discretionary opti-
mization problem:
Monetary policy maker solves: VMt = minit
(
UMPLTt (Φp) + βEtV
M
t+1
)
Fiscal policy maker solves: V Ft = minFt
(
USt + βEtV
F
t+1
)
subject to the system of constraints (12)-(16) and with the delegated monetary policy objective
UMPLTt (Φp) = p
2
t +Φp
(
θκ
σǫ
c2t +
κ
ψǫ
y2t +
(1− θ)κ
σǫ
g2t
)
.
In comparison with the flow social objective USt , the flow monetary objective U
MPLT
t replaces the
term in inflation with a term in the price level. In delegating this target to the monetary authority,
the weight on real variables is chosen by searching for the value which minimizes the expected
social losses that would emerge as a result of the equilibrium outcomes observed under the time
consistent strategic interactions between the monetary and fiscal authorities. The parameter Φp is
chosen in a time invariant way, based on the conditional loss achieved under the non-cooperative
regime. By choosing Φp to maximize society’s welfare under delegation, it allows the delegation
schemes to perform as well as possible given their structure.
3.1.3 Delegation: Monetary Nominal Income Targeting
The second regime we consider is that of monetary nominal income targeting (MNIT). This
regime has recently attracted a lot of attention — as we discuss in the Introduction — and it has
nominal output as a target. Similar to the MPLT, we solve
Φn = arg min
Φn≥0
LMNIT (Φn)
where LMNIT (Φn) is the conditional loss generated by the non-cooperative discretionary opti-
mization problem:
Monetary policy maker solves: VMt = minit
(
UMNITt (Φn) + βEtV
M
t+1
)
Fiscal policy maker solves: V Ft = minFt
(
USt + βEtV
F
t+1
)
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subject to the system of constraints (12)-(16) and with the monetary objective given by,
UMNITt (Φn) =
(
pt + Yˆt
)2
+Φn
(
θκ
σǫ
c2t +
κ
ψǫ
y2t +
(1− θ)κ
σǫ
g2t
)
.
Note that the Yˆt measures the percentage deviation of output from steady state and not the gap
between output and its natural level, yt, since most calls for nominal income targeting focus on
targeting nominal output rather than the output gap.
3.2 Timing
The timing of events in this model is conventional: at the beginning of every period t the state
variables, debt B˜t−1 and the price level pt−1, are known and the cost-push and technology shocks,
υˆt and Zˆt, respectively, realize and are observed by all economic agents, the policy makers and
the private sector. Knowing the state realization, and anticipating the private sector’s reaction
— as described by households’ and firms’ first order conditions — the policy makers choose the
interest rate and fiscal policy instruments. Then, the private sector chooses consumption and
prices at the end of the period.13 The equilibrium responses πt, ct and policy instruments it, Ft
result in a new level of states B˜t and pt by the beginning of the next period, t+ 1.
There are two policy makers: the central bank and the fiscal authority which stabilize the
economy following shocks. Policymakers act cooperatively if they share common objectives,
although this may be under discretion or commitment depending on whether or not they are
able to make credible promises about their future policies. Policymakers are assumed to act
strategically, rather than cooperatively, if their objectives differ. If they do not cooperate, they
could make decisions either simultaneously without taking each others’ actions into account,
or they can observe and anticipate each others’ policy decisions, as one of the authorities may
have intraperiod leadership. An intraperiod leader knows the policy objectives — and therefore
the reaction function — of the follower and takes this into account when choosing its policy, by
treating the follower’s reaction function as a constraint in its optimization.
In this paper we assume the regime of fiscal leadership throughout, such that the fiscal au-
thority acts as an intra-period leader. Fiscal leadership is consistent with the empirical evidence,
as monetary policy objectives are much more transparent and the subsequent monetary policy
reaction is anticipated by the fiscal policymaker. It should be stressed that Fiscal Leadership
is not the same as Fiscal Dominance and we are not assuming that the central bank is forced
to accommodate the actions of the fiscal authority. It is simply that, for example, the fiscal
13This timing is standard in the literature on dynamic monetary policy, see e.g. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999).
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authority may anticipate that the central bank will react to, say, a fiscal stimulus by attempting
to stabilize any inflation that it generates.
In what follows we, therefore, assume that the fiscal authority minimizes the social welfare
loss with flow USt and moves first, after the state is observed at the beginning of each period.
The monetary authority minimizes the delegated objective with flow cost UMPLTt or U
MNIT
t and
moves after the fiscal policymaker but before the private sector takes its decisions at the end of
each period.
When all policymakers share the common objective with flow USt , the order of moves is
inconsequential. However, in what follows, it is more intuitive to assume that the order of
moves under cooperation is the same as under non-cooperation with a delegated monetary policy
objective such that the only policy change is the introduction of a delegated objective function
for the monetary authority without any change in the timing of moves.
4 Calibration and Numerical Solution
4.1 Calibration
This model is highly stylized and involves relatively few parameters. Calibration of β = 0.99
and α = 0.75 corresponds to the most frequently estimated values of the steady state annual
interest rate of 4% and the average frequency of price changes of one year. We calibrate the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply ψ = 3.0, consistent with the macro-evidence of Peterman (2012)
based on empirical work which matches volatilities of aggregate worked hours and of wages. We
calibrate the intertemporal elasticity as σ = 0.5, based on evidence in Hall (1988), Campbell and
Mankiw (1989) and Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995). The elasticity of substitution between
goods, ǫ, is set to 11 based on evidence in Chari et al. (2000) and corresponds to a 10% mark up.
The share of government consumption in output is assumed to be, 25% such that 1− θ = 0.25,
consistently with Gali (1994) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013). Given our assumption of an
efficient steady state fiscal spending rule we obtain the corresponding parameter ̟ =
(
1−θ
θ
) 1
σ
in the household utility function. Due to the use of the employment subsidy, the deterministic
steady state is efficient and the steady-state value of welfare relevant variables like private and
public consumption, output and labor supply will be invariant to the calibrated debt to output
ratio and its maturity. We conduct a robustness exercise which explores alternative calibrations
of these key parameters in online Appendix F.
The remainder of the fiscal side of the model is calibrated as follows. Figure 1 plots a range
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Figure 1: Debt and maturity for selected countries
of debt to output ratios and average debt maturities for a representative sample of advanced
countries. These define the range of debt and maturities that we consider across our various policy
exercises. The geometrically declining debt maturity structure implies the average maturity of
debt is given by m = 11−βρ , and we consider a range of annualized maturities ma =
1
4m between
one and eight years. Calibration of m gives us ρ = 1β −
1
βm . Similarly, we consider range of
annualized debt to output ratios, Θ = BP
M
4Y , lying between 0 and 160% of annualized output.
For a specific case, the debt to output ratio which prevails in the economy in absence of shocks is
χ = 4Θ/PM = (τ+θ−1)(1−βρ)1−β , which ties down the steady-state tax rate as τ =
χ(1−β)
(1−βρ)+1−θ, given
the steady state share of of government consumption in output 1− θ. Note that this calibration
approach assumes that we study a variety of economies, which differ with respect to their debt
maturities and their steady state levels of taxes and debt to output ratios. If such an economy is
hit by a shock, the variables will eventually converge to their steady state values. The steady state
debt to output ratio, therefore, works as an implicit debt target for policy makers who choose
the steady state level of taxes consistently with the debt to output ratio. This approach contrasts
with an alternative interpretation where the currently observed difference in debt to output ratios
is seen as a temporary deviation from a steady state which is the same for all countries.
We calibrate the technology shock as an AR(1) process Zˆt = ρzZˆt−1 + εzt with ρz = 0.95
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and σ (εzt) = 0.008. This is broadly in line with the values used in Canzoneri et al. (2006)
(ρz, σ (εzt)) = (0.92, 0.0090)), Ireland (2004) (ρz, σ (εzt)) = (1.00, 0.0109)) and those used in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) (ρz, σ (εzt)) = (0.86, 0.0064)).
14 Among these three studies, only
Ireland (2004) uses a cost-push shock, which is AR(1) with a standard deviation of 0.0044. Smets
and Wouters (2003) reports an i.i.d. cost push shock with a much smaller standard deviation in
the model with inflation persistence, while Rudebusch (2002) estimates a standard deviation of
0.01 for an i.i.d. cost push shock. In the analysis below, we calibrate the standard deviation of
an i.i.d. cost push shock υˆt as 0.005.
Finally, all losses we compute are conditional on the initial state, assumed to be the non-
stochastic steady state, which all variants of the policy regimes share.
4.2 Solution Algorithm
Our definition of discretionary policy is conventional and is widely used in the monetary pol-
icy literature, see, for example, Backus and Driffill (1986), Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Clarida
et al. (1999), and Woodford (2003). Solving the cooperative case is straightforward, and the
numerical algorithm follows Söderlind (1999). The algorithm to solve the non-cooperative dis-
cretionary problem with intra-period leadership is given in Blake and Kirsanova (2011). In the
non-cooperative case, as well as in case of cooperation, the system of first order conditions is
reduced to a system of matrix Riccati equations in the unknown coefficients of decision rules
and value function matrices. A fixed point solution to this system satisfies economic agents’
expectations and the policy makers’ Bellman equations. However, the assumption of intra-period
fiscal leadership affects the form of the monetary authority’s decision rule. The solution of the
optimization problem of the follower — the monetary policy maker, who observes fiscal policy
decisions and treats Ft as an additional state — yields a monetary decision rule which takes into
the account the current value of fiscal policy instrument Ft, the current values of shocks and the
level of debt B˜t−1. Therefore, the intra-period leading fiscal policy maker influences the decisions
of the follower and the fiscal authorities take this influence into account when formulating policy.
More details of the solution algorithm are provided in Appendix D.
5 Value of Delegation
In this section we study the implications of the fiscal environment in terms of the level of debt
and its maturity on the nature of the stabilization bias and the value of alternative delegation
14Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) do not consider cost-push shocks.
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schemes which aim to reduce the welfare costs of shocks relative to the case of cooperative
discretion, and bring outcomes closer to the case of cooperative commitment. First, we examine
the relative efficacy of the two fiscal instruments, distortionary taxation and government spending,
in responding to technology and cost-push shocks in order to provide intuition for subsequent
results where the choice of instrument is key. Second, we explore the stabilization bias itself again
using various permutations of taxes and government consumption as fiscal policy instruments.
Third, we explore to what extent the delegation schemes outlined above can improve outcomes
relative to cooperative discretion, effectively offsetting some of the stabilization bias. Throughout,
we explore the implications of the government only having access to one fiscal instrument for
stabilization purposes in line with the empirical evidence presented in the introduction, since this
is a key determinant of the efficacy of the two delegation schemes.
5.1 Alternative Fiscal Instruments
Some intuition for the relative efficacy of the tax and spending fiscal instruments can be found
by, following Eser et al. (2009), considering what optimal policy would be if the policy maker
had access to a lump-sum tax to satisfy its budget constraint. This assumption implies Ricardian
Equivalence holds and, as a result, the government’s budget constraint ceases to impose any costs
on the policy maker. However, we still wish to see how the policy maker would utilize government
spending and distortionary taxation in order to mitigate the welfare consequences of shocks in a
sticky-price economy, in the absence of a need to stabilize debt. In this case the policy problem
under commitment reduces to the following Lagrangian
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[π2t +
θκ
σǫ
c2t +
κ
ψǫ
y2t +
(1− θ)κ
σǫ
g2t
+2λπt (πt − υˆt −
κψ
ǫ+ ψ
(
Υ
1−Υ
τ t +
1
ψ
yt +
1
σ
ct
)
− βπt+1)
+2λyt (yt − θct − (1− θ) gt)],
with first order conditions for the output gap
κ
ǫψ
yt −
κ
ǫ+ ψ
λπt + λ
y
t = 0,
consumption gap
θκ
ǫσ
ct −
κψ
(ǫ+ ψ)σ
λπt − θλ
y
t = 0,
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and government spending gap
(1− θ)κ
ǫσ
gt − (1− θ)λ
y
t = 0,
which can be combined to yield,
gt = λ
y
t = 0
yt = θct =
ǫψ
ǫ+ ψ
λπt
In other words, the government spending gap would always be zero in the presence of both tech-
nology and cost-push shocks regardless of the weight attached to public consumption in utility.
This implies that variations in government spending do not contribute anything to the stabiliza-
tion of the economy following cost push shocks (assuming access to a lump-sum tax to satisfy the
government’s budget constraint) even although inflation and the output gap may be non-zero in
the face of such shocks. The intuition is that monetary policy is a more effective stabilization tool
than government spending. Tightening monetary policy not only reduces demand through its im-
pact on consumption, but increases supply as households reduce leisure in line with consumption.
In contrast, government spending impacts solely on aggregate demand, implying a more costly
reduction in output to achieve a given reduction in inflation. This makes monetary policy better
placed to deal with the trade-offs implied by cost-push shocks even although it cannot offset such
shocks completely.15
The first-order condition for inflation is given by
πt + λ
π
t − λ
π
t−1 = 0,
which can be combined with the first order condition for output to give the usual target criterion
πt = −
ǫ+ ψ
ǫψ
∆yt,
which reveals the optimal trade-off between output and inflation stabilization in the face of cost-
push shocks. It also implies the price level control which is a feature of policy under commitment.16
When the policy maker also utilizes the distortionary tax rate as a policy instrument then its
first order condition implies λπt = 0 which can be achieved by adjusting the tax rate to perfectly
offset the cost-push shock,
κψ
ǫ+ ψ
Υ
1−Υ
τ t = −υˆt
15See Eser et al. (2009) for a full discussion of this result.
16Since the output gap must eventually be eliminated this first order condition implies that the sum of changes in
the output gap, and therefore, cumulative inflation will both be zero. This implies that the price level is returned
to base following shocks.
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without generating any inflation. Effectively, the policy maker offsets the distortion generated
by the cost-push shock by varying the distortion associated with taxation in an offsetting way.
Therefore, when Ricardian Equivalence holds, monetary policy and variations in distortionary
tax rates can replicate the first-best outcome: monetary policy perfectly offsets technology shocks
without requiring any fiscal policy response, while variations in distortionary taxes can perfectly
offset the inflationary consequences of cost-push shocks without generating efficiency gaps in other
welfare relevant variables. In the face of either shock the government spending gap is always zero.
We can see these results in the impulse response functions presented in Figure 2. In the face of
the technology shock, when the policy maker can eliminate the fiscal consequences of the shock
with lump sum taxation, neither fiscal instrument is needed to optimally stabilize the economy
and all gaps and inflation are zero. In the face of a cost-push shock, the policy maker faces a
trade-off between output and inflation stabilization unless the distortionary tax instrument is
employed to completely offset that shock too.
Our policy problem is complicated by not allowing the policy maker to have access to a lump-
sum tax to stabilize debt following shocks, and as a result the policy maker must deviate from this
first-best policy in order to ensure that the government’s budget constraint is satisfied. This is
what creates meaningful policy trade-offs in our model, which will be more costly the greater the
direct fiscal consequences of either type of shock are. Since, in the absence of a fiscal constraint,
there is no desire to vary either gt or τ t following technology shocks, the direct fiscal implications
of technology shocks are captured by the coefficient in expression (17), which tends to be quite
small such that the deviation from the first best policy in response to technology shocks is not
quantitatively important. This can be seen in the second set of panels of Figure 2 where the
inflationary and fiscal consequences of a technology shock are small across both permutations of
fiscal policy instrument.17 However, the relative magnitude of the degree of price level drift is
significantly higher when the fiscal authority is unable to vary the distortionary tax instrument.
In the case of cost-push shocks the nature of the policy trade-offs depends crucially on whether
or not the policy maker can respond to the shock with the distortionary tax instrument. When
they can, the tax instrument largely offsets the cost-push shock with limited inflationary and
fiscal consequences. In contrast, when this instrument is not employed to mitigate the effects of a
cost-push shock, there is a far larger inflationary and fiscal response to the same cost-push shock
which government spending is not effective in offsetting. This can be seen in Figure 2 where we
17As a result of the welfare impact of technology shocks being small we focus on cost-push shocks for the remainder
of the paper since these drive the results. Nevertheless, the small impact from technology shocks are still included
in all welfare calculations.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to one-standard-deviation positive shock. Annual debt to output
ratio is 20%, and maturity of debt is 8 years. All values are quarterly.
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can see that with access to distortionary taxation as a stabilization tool, under commitment, debt
rises permanently as a result of the cost-push shock and the price level is not fully returned to
base. This is different from the case where debt can be stabilized with lump-sum taxes where
there would be no drift in either debt or the price level. However, the magnitude of the price
level drift is small. Turning to the case when the distortionary tax rate is held constant, the fiscal
authority uses government spending to help stabilize debt even although it contributes nothing to
combating the cost-push shock itself. This means that the initial rise in inflation is even greater
than in the case where lump-sum taxes can satisfy the government’s budget constraint and we
see a permanent drift in the price level which, at this steady-state debt level, is far greater than
that observed when distortionary taxes are used to offset the cost-push shock.
Therefore, under commitment, when the policy instruments available to the policy maker are
effective in dealing with the consequences of specific types of shock in the absence of a need to
stabilize debt, creating an additional need to stabilize debt implies that there is only limited drift
in the price level even although formally strict price level control is no longer a feature of optimal
policy. However, when the available instruments are less effective in dealing with a specific shock,
the optimal policy will tend to allow a greater degree of price level drift which is only partially
offset in the long-run.
5.2 The Stabilization Bias: Commitment vs. Discretion
5.2.1 Commitment
Figure 3 plots contour maps of the percentage of steady-state consumption that the consumer
would be willing to give up to move from the regime being considered to the steady-state allocation
in maturity-debt space under commitment and discretion (and the difference between them,
the stabilization bias), where the fiscal instruments include either both taxes and government
spending jointly, or each instrument individually. Two results are apparent. First, consider the
first row of Figure 3 which details the welfare losses under commitment. These are very low when
the benevolent policy maker has access to taxes as a fiscal instrument, but are substantially higher
when only government spending is available as a fiscal instrument. Second, the pattern of losses
across debt levels and maturity also differ conditional on the availability of the tax instrument.
When taxation is available as an instrument, welfare losses rise with debt levels and maturity,
while when government spending is the only available instrument, welfare losses are falling with
maturity.
We can see this more clearly by looking at the impulse responses to a cost-push shock under
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two scenarios: (i) high debt — short maturity, and (ii) low debt — long maturity in Figures 4-5.
Impulse responses under commitment are plotted with dotted-circled lines.
In Figure 4 the fiscal authority employs both fiscal instruments. Under commitment we obtain
the usual result from the literature that the steady state level of debt follows a random walk (see,
for example, Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)), such that in
the long run the benevolent policy maker will adjust available fiscal instruments to service the
new steady state debt level. The reason why the policy maker does not attempt to return debt
to its pre-shock level is that the long run benefits of going further and reducing steady state debt
are exactly balanced by the short-run costs of doing so. This, in essence, is the standard tax
smoothing result generalized to a New Keynesian economy. Despite this, there is, however, some
attempt to offset the fiscal consequences of the shock in the initial periods following the shock.
To do so the policy maker seeks to raise inflation slightly to reduce the ex post real rates of return
on government debt relative to the ex ante rates. With only single period debt, this inflation
surprise would only occur in the initial period, while with longer-maturity debt the policy maker
can spread the inflation surprise over a longer time period (see Sims (2013)). Additionally, the
advantage of doing so is greater with higher debt levels as the impact on real interest rates is
more effective when applied to a larger stock of debt. In both cases (high debt — short maturity
and low debt — long maturity) the response, is however, extremely small such that there is very
little drift in the price level following the cost-push shock. In the initial period taxes are cut
to moderate the initial jump in inflation arising from the i.i.d. cost-push shock. Subsequently,
there is a permanent increase in taxation, and very slight cut in spending to service the higher
debt stock. The rise in the debt stock is greater in the high debt — short maturity case as the
ability to sustain a moderate inflation surprise with longer maturity dominates the impact of a
higher initial debt level. Essentially, once we move beyond the shortest of debt maturities, the
key fiscal variable determining welfare losses under commitment is the debt to output ratio. This
is reflected in the welfare contours of Figure 3. If the policy maker only has access to the tax
instrument the results are very similar: government spending contributes very little to the fiscal
adjustment and, again, there is very little drift in the price level under the optimal commitment
policy.18
In Figure 5, where the benevolent policy maker is forced to rely solely on government con-
sumption as its fiscal instrument, the results are quite different. The long run still features a
rise in government debt following the cost-push shock, which is serviced by cutting government
18See Figure 1 in Appendix E.
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Figure 3: Welfare losses for commitment and discretion and the stabilization bias. All losses
are measured in percentage of steady-state consumption that the consumer would be willing to
give up to move from the actual regime to the steady-state allocation. T&G, T and G refer
to ‘taxes and spending’, ‘taxes only’ and ‘spending only’ based fiscal stabilization, respectively.
Both technology and cost-push shocks are used.
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Figure 4: Dynamic responses to one-standard-deviation positive cost push shock. Tax—spending
based fiscal stabilization for different delegation schemes. Panel I: Annualized debt to output
ratio Θ = 20%, maturity ma = 8 years, Panel II: Annualized debt to output ratio Θ = 120%,
maturity ma = 3 years.
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Figure 5: Dynamic responses to one-standard-deviation positive cost push shock. Spending-
based fiscal stabilization for different delegation schemes. Panel I: Annualized debt to output
ratio Θ = 20%, maturity ma = 8 years, Panel II: Annualized debt to output ratio Θ = 120%,
Annualized debt to output ratio ma = 3 years.
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consumption. However, in the transition to the new steady state there is a sustained rise in real
interest rates, and a commitment to reduce inflation below target — after the shock has passed —
to moderate the initial inflation consequences of the cost-push shock. However, this commitment
is not nearly strong enough to prevent the increase in the price level immediately following the
cost-push shock. This depresses bond prices, so that the value of government debt actually falls
during the transition, despite ultimately rising in the long-run. Under the high debt — short
maturity scenario the permanent adjustment of government spending is greater, as there is less
scope to deflate debt through surprise inflation as debt maturity falls. This is also reflected in
the welfare contours in the top right corner of Figure 3.
In summary, optimal policy implies a commitment to adjust fiscal instruments to permanently
sustain the debt stock that emerges following shocks. However, unlike the policy implemented in
the standard monetary policy-only version of the New Keynesian model, the commitment policy
does not fully stabilize the price level. The degree of price level slippage depends on both the level
and maturity structure of the debt stock, but most particularly on the availability or otherwise
of taxation as a fiscal instrument. When distortionary taxation is available, the policy maker will
tend to only allow a very mild degree of drift in the price level following cost-push shocks. In
contrast, without access to this policy instrument, the fiscal response to cost-push shocks is far
more muted and, although there is an attempt to influence inflationary expectations through a
medium term tightening of policy, there is a larger short- and long-run deviation from price level
stability. This is reflected in significantly higher welfare costs when taxation is unavailable as a
policy instrument, and is likely to make delegation schemes with price level targets less attractive.
5.2.2 Discretion and the Stabilization Bias
We now turn to consider the implications of the policy maker not having an ability to commit.
The second row of Figure 3 gives the corresponding welfare contour maps for the case of discre-
tion. Again, two results are apparent. First, the size of the reduction in social welfare relative
to commitment — the stabilization bias — depends on the choice of fiscal instrument. In the case
where the fiscal authority has access to taxes — either on their own or in conjunction with gov-
ernment spending — shows that the welfare losses under discretion rise substantially relative to
commitment, such that the stabilization bias in the first two columns is almost identical to the
welfare losses under discretion. In the final column, where government spending is the sole fiscal
instrument, there is a far less dramatic deterioration in welfare when moving from commitment
to discretion. Second, in contrast to commitment, the shape of the welfare contours is similar
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across all permutations of fiscal policy instrument. The stabilization bias is higher with shorter
maturity, although when maturity is very short, the bias is an inverse U-shaped function of the
debt to output ratio if taxes are available. In other words, given a relatively short maturity,
welfare initially falls as debt levels rise, but eventually higher debt makes stabilization less costly.
As above, we can obtain intuition for these results by considering the impulse response func-
tions to an i.i.d. cost push shock under the same two scenarios: high debt — short maturity and
low debt — long maturity. Figure 4 plots the case of both fiscal instruments. Under discretion,
steady state debt no longer follows a random walk in the face of shocks, but returns to its initial
steady state value. In the face of the i.i.d. cost push shock there is a surprise rise in inflation in
the initial period, which reduces the value of government debt. This is mitigated by a fall in the
tax rate in the initial period, although this offsetting fiscal policy reacts far less than it would do
under commitment. As a result, monetary policy is tightened in an attempt to control inflation.
The gradual stabilization of debt proceeds by raising taxes with a tightening of monetary policy
to reduce the inflationary consequences of this. This policy mix returns debt to its initial value,
but the welfare costs of doing so are substantial. Having access to government spending does
not materially affect the policy maker’s ability to stabilize the economy in the face of cost-push
shocks, provided they do have access to taxes. These patterns are similar across the two cases of
debt levels and maturities, although with higher debt surprise inflation becomes a more effective
tool in stabilizing debt, see Leeper and Leith (2016) for a discussion. This changing policy mix,
particularly across debt levels, then drives the patterns of welfare losses.
When we examine the case where the fiscal authorities only have access to government spend-
ing as their fiscal instrument, then welfare is lower relative to the case where taxes are available,
but the deterioration in welfare for discretion relative to commitment is less sharp. The reason
for this can be seen from the impulse response functions in Figure 5, again considering the two
cases of high debt — short maturity and low debt — long maturity. Under discretion the policy
maker cannot commit to maintain debt at a new higher level following the cost push shock, and
is compelled to return debt to its original value. This adds a welfare cost relative to commitment.
However, under commitment the policy maker already struggled to successfully offset the cost
push shock — the now unavailable tax instrument is the ideal tool to offset such shocks through
their impact on marginal costs — so that the discretionary policy which both offsets the cost push
shock and returns debt to steady state is simply a slightly more aggressive form of the policy
under commitment. The pattern of adjustments under commitment and discretion — with only
government spending available as a fiscal instrument — is similar, although the steady state debt
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levels have an impact on the policy mix, such that under the high debt case government spending
is cut by more and interest rates are raised by less as a result of the heightened debt stabilization
bias and higher inflation that emerges.
5.3 Delegation Schemes
We now turn to consider the welfare gains from two alternative delegation schemes: MPLT
and MNIT. These schemes are parameterized to give the highest possible welfare given their
structure. The first row of Figure 6 replicates the stabilization bias contour map detailed in
the last row of Figure 3. Rows 2 and 3 of Figure 6 then plot the welfare gains associated
with the two delegation schemes. For MNIT, provided the fiscal authorities have access to the
tax instrument, the welfare gains are substantial, but leave a non-trivial residual welfare cost. In
contrast, when the government can only employ government consumption as its fiscal instrument,
the welfare gains are very modest and can actually turn negative, i.e. the delegation scheme can
make outcomes worse. Turning to the final row of Figure 6, with access to the tax-instrument-
delegation of a price level target can effectively reduce the welfare loss to the level achieved
under cooperative commitment for most debt levels and maturities, while, without access to this
instrument, welfare gains from delegation are only realized at low debt levels — long maturities,
and are likely to be negative at high debt levels — short maturities.
We can see these patterns more clearly in Figure 7, which presents pictograms where the area
of each bar corresponds to the percentage of steady-state consumption that the consumer would
be willing to give up to move from the regime being considered to the steady-state allocation
free of shocks under discretion, the delegation scheme and commitment respectively.19 These
are plotted for the cases of taxes and spending being jointly available as instruments, or with
only government consumption being available.20 When the welfare losses under the delegation
scheme are shaded this indicates that the losses under that scheme are actually worse than the
outcome under cooperative discretion. The first column of the chart shows that when the fiscal
authorities have access to taxation as an instrument, there are potentially substantial welfare
gains to delegation under both schemes, but particularly under a MPLT which largely reduces
the loss to levels similar to those under cooperative commitment unless debt levels are particularly
19The absolute levels of welfare losses are not crucial, but the figure shows the relative levels of welfare across
discretion, the delegation scheme and commitment simultaneously, so the shape of each loss is clear across debt
levels and maturity, as well as the proportion which is eliminated/remains under delegation scheme.
20The case of only taxes being available looks very similar to the case of both government consumption and taxes
being used since government spending adds very little to stabilization policy in this case and so is omitted. It is
available upon request.
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Figure 6: Welfare losses for different delegation schemes. All losses are measured in percentage of
steady-state consumption that the consumer would be willing to give up to move from the actual
regime to the steady-state allocation. T&G, T and G refer to ‘taxes and spending’, ‘taxes only’
and ‘spending only’ based fiscal stabilization, respectively. Both technology and cost-push shocks
are used.
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high and maturity particularly short.21
In contrast, when, as in the latest evidence on the form of fiscal consolidations from the
IMF (2012), fiscal stabilization largely takes place through government spending, the gains to
delegation are far more fragile. Under nominal-income targeting the gains to delegation are
only positive, and still modest, if maturity is sufficiently low and turn negative for high debt
maturities. While the price level target is only beneficial if debt to output ratios are sufficiently
low and maturities sufficiently long. Again, even in the cases where there are benefits to delegation
when fiscal adjustment is through spending alone, these gains are modest.
We can gain intuition for these results by returning to the plots of the impulse response
functions following an i.i.d. cost-push shock in Figures 4-5 where the permutation of fiscal instru-
ments, available to the fiscal authority, varies across the figures.22 Considering the case of the
fiscal authority having access to both fiscal instruments in Figure 4 and again allowing for the
two scenarios of high debt — short maturity and low debt — long maturity, we explore the policy
mix under the two delegation schemes. For price level targeting the outcomes are very close to
those under commitment and, since commitment largely eliminates inflation, the form of MPLT
is optimally chosen to be strict, i.e. the limiting case of Φp = 0. Over the time horizon plotted
it even appears as though debt is permanently higher, although it is actually the case that debt
very gradually returns to its steady state. In essence the strict price level target prevents the
policy maker being tempted to inflate away the debt. This in turn has a beneficial impact on
expectations allowing outcomes to move closer to the case of cooperative commitment.
Under MNIT, given that taxes are employed as the fiscal instrument, the optimal nominal-
income target is strict across both cases of debt level/maturity considered, i.e. the limiting case
of Φn = 0. (The desirability of strict MNIT is common across all but the most heavily indebted
economies in our sample of economies considered in Section 6. Only Greece, Italy and Japan
would benefit from implementing a flexible form of MNIT, given taxation is the fiscal stabilization
instrument.) In this case, MNIT produces results which, while they improve upon cooperative
discretion do not achieve as significant an improvement as MPLT. Essentially, MNIT produces
an outcome which is a half-way house between cooperative commitment and discretion, which is
clearly observed in Figure 7.
Given the form of monetary objectives under strict MNIT, the loss of the monetary authorities
21 In most cases the second bar in each pictogram is virtually indistinguishable from the third bar such that the
delegation scheme comes close to achieving the welfare levels under commitment.
22We only consider cost-push shocks when discussing transmission mechanisms. All losses/gains, however, are
computed based on both shocks.
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will be eliminated if pt = −Yˆt = −θCˆt so a reduction in consumption can increase the monetary
authority’s tolerance of positive inflation, cet. par. This in turn reduces the policy makers’ desire
to reduce government debt as rapidly as they would under cooperative discretion, thereby moving
equilibrium outcomes towards those observed under commitment, see Figure 1 in Appendix E.
Expectations of future price stabilization play a very important role in both regimes, MNIT
and MPLT. These expectations drive the level of consumption down by enough to generate the
required reduction in marginal costs. In this sense inflation is stabilized by mere expectations
of future policy. This is particularly relevant for MNIT as the nominal interest rate initially
falls, but the resulting reaction of inflation is sufficient to ensure a welfare gain relative to the
outcome under cooperative discretion. While price stabilization is expected, it does not need
to be achieved under MNIT as quickly as under MPLT. For the monetary policy maker, who
determines the speed of adjustment, the desire to reduce the increased price level is offset by
lower real income, and these variables can only move in opposite directions if the adjustment
is slow. However, since the commitment policy using taxes as its fiscal instrument generates
negligible inflation — and therefore a near constant price level — a delegated policy objective of
strict MPLT comes closest to mimicking commitment outcomes.
When we turn to government spending based stabilization the fiscal environment starts to
matter much more. With the price level target, the optimal target is not strict as it is when
taxes are part of the policy mix, and during the transition the price level deviates from base
substantially. In this case the delegated policy allows the price level to initially rise before
returning it to base. Since commitment policy neither generates price stability nor is hugely
successful in offsetting the cost push shock in this case, this softens the desirability of making the
price level target strict. In the high debt — short maturity scenario welfare actually deteriorates
under a delegated price level target. The eventual stabilization of the price level means that the
initial inflation is undone relatively quickly which mitigates the ability of surprise inflation to
reduce the need for subsequent fiscal adjustments to stabilize debt. The policy mix involves an
initial fall in interest rates and government spending, the latter seeking to reduce both debt and
the initial boost to inflation caused by the cost-push shock. Subsequently, the interest rate and
government spending rise, such that the balance of this combination is tilted towards reducing
aggregate demand to facilitate the return of the price level to its initial value. Such behavior
generates large deviations of the price level from the target. However, even if the optimal weight
on the price level target, Φp, is reduced, the constraint to stabilize price level is too restrictive
to deliver welfare gains. In contrast, when debt is low and maturity long, price level targeting
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delivers outcomes similar to those under commitment.
Turning to MNIT with only spending as a fiscal instrument, the high debt — short maturity
case allows the fiscal authority to raise spending in the knowledge that the monetary authority will
raise interest rates to achieve the nominal income target. This gives rise to a large fall in the value
of debt. Thereafter, government spending is reduced slightly and monetary policy remains tight
to return debt and the price level to their long-run values. Therefore, MNIT allows monetary and
fiscal policy to generate an initial reduction in the value of government debt, before they gently
return debt and the price level to steady state. In contrast, when debt levels are low but maturity
long, MNIT delegation worsens welfare outcomes: the desire to stabilize nominal income means
that the initial fall in the real value of debt is reduced once the government spending substantially
increases in order to stabilize nominal income. The magnitude of the volatility of spending and
inflation over the transition explains the deterioration in welfare.
In summary, with access to the tax instrument, the two policy makers can deal effectively with
shocks, while the two delegation schemes, especially price-level targeting, can reduce welfare losses
below those under cooperative discretion. This is due to the fact that the delegated nominal target
prevents the policy makers inducing inflation surprises as a means of stabilizing debt. Without
access to the tax policy instrument, the response to the cost-push shock in particular is far less
effective and the optimal policy response includes a substantial deviation from short-run price
level control. As a result the delegated targets can actually worsen outcomes by encouraging
larger policy adjustments. Price level targeting increases the pace of adjustment towards the
price level target relative to nominal income targeting, this is desirable when debt is large and of
short maturity, but is less desirable when debt is of longer maturity.
6 Country Specific Experience
The results indicate that the steady-state debt level and debt maturity structure matter for the
performance of monetary delegation schemes. In this section, we seek to show that these findings
are relevant in practice. In particular, we look at how the different delegation schemes would fare
for the debt and maturity structures of a set OECD countries, where debt and maturity are set
to their levels measured in 2015.
Table 1 describes the welfare outcomes under commitment, discretion and the two delegation
schemes. More specifically, Table 1 reports the values of social welfare losses for a representative
sample of advanced economies. Columns (1)-(2) determine the position of a country in Figure 1.
All losses are measured in terms of the equivalent percentage loss of steady state consumption,
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Table 1: The value of delegation for selected countries
Fiscal Stabilization T&G Fiscal Stabilization G
Θ ma MPLT MNIT D C MPLT MNIT D C
L ∆L L ∆L LD LC L ∆L L ∆L LD LC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
FR 89.4 6.8 0.02 0.50 0.23 0.28 0.52 0.02 0.65 -0.02 0.67 -0.04 0.63 0.47
GE 48.4 6.6 0.02 0.49 0.22 0.29 0.51 0.02 0.50 0.14 0.67 -0.04 0.63 0.46
GR 175.0 7.9 0.02 0.46 0.23 0.25 0.48 0.02 0.95 -0.34 0.68 -0.06 0.61 0.47
IR 82.4 12.4 0.02 0.44 0.22 0.24 0.46 0.02 0.47 0.14 0.67 -0.06 0.61 0.46
IT 113.5 6.4 0.02 0.50 0.24 0.29 0.53 0.02 0.79 -0.16 0.68 -0.04 0.63 0.47
JP 126.0 6.8 0.02 0.49 0.24 0.28 0.52 0.02 0.83 -0.20 0.68 -0.05 0.63 0.47
SP 64.8 6.0 0.02 0.51 0.23 0.30 0.53 0.02 0.59 0.05 0.67 -0.03 0.64 0.47
SE -18.4 5.0 0.02 0.45 0.21 0.26 0.47 0.02 0.46 0.15 0.67 -0.06 0.61 0.46
SW 24.9 8.8 0.02 0.47 0.21 0.28 0.49 0.02 0.46 0.16 0.67 -0.05 0.62 0.46
UK 80.3 14.5 0.02 0.43 0.22 0.23 0.46 0.02 0.46 0.15 0.67 -0.06 0.61 0.46
US 79.9 5.7 0.02 0.52 0.23 0.30 0.54 0.02 0.70 -0.06 0.67 -0.03 0.65 0.47
Notes: Θ in column (1) is annualized debt to output ratio, measured in percents; ma in column
(2) is maturity of debt measured in years. LD and LC are losses under benevolent discretion and
commitment, respectively, L measures welfare loss under the corresponding delegation regime,
and ∆L=LD − L is the loss relative to benevolent discretion; all welfare losses in columns (3)
— (14) are percentages of steady-state consumption that the consumer would be willing to give
up to move from the actual regime to the deterministic steady state allocation. The IMF Fiscal
Monitor is the source of data in columns (1) and (2). The data are for 2015 for all countries
except Greece, the data for Greece are for 2014.
which would match the welfare losses due to the stochastic volatility of the economy. Columns
(8) and (14) report the loss under commitment regime (C). It is apparent that the loss, when
policy makers are free to commit, in tax-based stabilization regimes (T&G) is much smaller than
the loss in spending-based (G) regimes. This largely reflects the relative efficacy of the two
fiscal instruments in combination with conventional monetary policy. The tax instrument can
act to offset cost-push shocks while monetary policy can mitigate the inflationary consequences
of technology shocks. In contrast government spending is less effective as a stabilization tool in
the face of either type of shock.
Columns (7) and (13) report the loss under the cooperative discretionary regime (D) and allow
us to infer the size of stabilization bias (not reported, but see Figure 3). The stabilization bias
is of order of 0.17% of steady state consumption for spending-based stabilization policies, while
it is around three times that for tax-based stabilization policy. Therefore, while the combination
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of tax and monetary policy is particularly potent in the hands of a benevolent policy maker who
is able to commit, when the policy makers are forced to act in a time-consistent manner this
potency leads to a significant increase in welfare losses (above those attained under cooperative
commitment) relative to the case where government spending is the fiscal instrument.
Columns (3), (5) and (9), (11) report the loss under a particular delegation scheme. Further-
more, columns (4), (6) and (10), (12) report the gain ∆L=LD − L if the particular delegation
scheme is implemented, where L is the loss under the corresponding delegation regime. A positive
value of ∆L indicates the delegation scheme has improved welfare, while anything negative has
worsened welfare. For example, if Germany implements MPLT delegation while the German fiscal
authority operates with taxes and spending, the outcome will nearly replicate the best outcome
under commitment policy.23 However, if Japan implements MPLT while their fiscal authority
uses spending as the fiscal instrument, then the welfare losses of 0.17% of steady-state consump-
tion due to stabilization bias will be increased by further 0.20%, such that they will more than
double. It is interesting to note that despite the fact that the underlying stabilization bias is
greatest when taxes are the fiscal instrument employed by the fiscal authorities, the effectiveness
of delegating a price-level target to the monetary authority is so large that all economies would
be better off under such a scheme.
7 Conclusion
This paper revisits the idea that discretionary monetary price level and nominal-income targeting
delegation schemes can reduce the welfare losses below those achieved under cooperative discre-
tionary policy. We demonstrate that in an economy with a strategic fiscal policy maker, who can
act as an intra-period leader and who seeks to follow a policy which minimizes the social welfare
loss as a policy objective, delegating a price level target to the monetary policy maker results in
a substantial welfare gain for a wide range of debt to output ratios and ‘not too short’ maturities,
but only if fiscal policy uses the tax rate as its policy instrument. Using government spending as
the fiscal instrument substantially limits the range of acceptable combinations to those economies
with relatively low debt to output ratios and long debt maturity. Out of a sample of 11 advanced
economies, only the low debt economies of Sweden and Switzerland would benefit from delegat-
ing a price-level target to the monetary authority when government spending serves as the fiscal
instrument, and none would wish to adopt a nominal income target.
23Further calculations show that only 0.10% of the original stabilization bias of 0.49% will be left.
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The mechanisms underpinning these results are driven by the ability of the different delega-
tion schemes to offset the stabilization bias inherent in the New Keynesian model extended to
include fiscal policy. Under commitment, policy makers can effectively offset both cost push and
technology shocks with very little drift in the price level provided they have access to distortionary
taxes as a policy instrument. Without access to taxation, but possibly with access to government
consumption, their ability to offset cost-push shocks is much reduced, welfare costs increase and
the optimal drift in the price level is correspondingly greater. However, without an ability to
commit, policy makers face a temptation to inflate away the fiscal consequences of shocks which
is particularly damaging relative to commitment when taxes are available a stabilization tool.
Delegation schemes, which impart an element of price level control, help mitigate the risks of
governments being tempted to induce inflation surprises to reduce debt levels and, when taxes
are used as a stabilization tool, allow monetary and fiscal policy to return to effectively respond-
ing to shocks. In contrast, when taxes are not available, optimal commitment policy allows for
a non-trivial degree of price level drift such that adopting a price-level or nominal-income target
can actually worsen outcomes relative to the case without delegation.
Although recent fiscal consolidations have tended to be heavily skewed towards adjustment of
government spending, our comparison of the relative efficacy of fiscal instruments in stabilization
of the economy reveals the relative pre-eminence of taxes. As noted immediately above, they are
best suited to mitigating the effects of cost-push shocks on inflation, while the associated losses
associated with the stabilization bias can be significantly reduced through the adoption of a price
level target by an independent monetary authority.
Despite demonstrating these results using a particular model, this model is at the core of more
general and empirically relevant DSGE models widely used in policy analysis. The economic
mechanisms discussed here are likely to apply and our results remain valid for this wide class of
models.
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